

Policy Coordination

Debt and Cash Management
and the Central Bank

DMF Stakeholders' Forum
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


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The Challenge

- Central banks (CBs) and DMOs/treasuries have different policy objectives and operational requirements
 - Potential strains between fiscal and monetary policies
 - Inconsistent objectives for different parts of government balance sheet
 - Operational conflicts or clashes
- But they have common interests
 - Efficient debt, cash and monetary policy operations
 - Development of the money market
 - Well-managed flow of services
- Requires
 - Understandings about responsibilities and objectives
 - Effective governance and coordination arrangements

An Overview – Policy and Operational Interaction



Focus today on 3 and 4; but first some brief comment on 1 and 2

High-level Policy Coordination

- Model of last 30 years - separating monetary policy from fiscal and debt/cash management policies under some strain
 - Assumes highly liquid markets, and independence of policy instruments – even in developed markets compromised by QE
 - In less developed markets always the case that cash and debt operations may affect monetary policy operations & vice versa
- Still a case for operational separation; but that requires mechanisms to facilitate
 - High-level policy coherence
 - Coordination at operational level
- Different mechanisms
 - Potential use of Public Debt Committee (PDC) or similar to facilitate coordination
 - Brings together representatives of main macroeconomic policy functions to ensure that cash and debt management decisions are properly embedded in wider macroeconomic policies

Changing Roles of CB and Treasury


Traditional Roles



Problems

- **Treasury:** Treasury primarily a gov't payment office; TSA incomplete; limited cash management
 - **CB:** managing domestic monetary conditions, including impact of gov't cash flows; directly influencing cash and debt management policies through its role as fiscal agent; range of services supplied to treasury
- Excess government liquidity; lack of interest on balances => a subsidy to banks
 - Volatile government cash flows complicate monetary policy operations
 - CB's implementation of debt and cash management policy potentially conflicting with monetary policy goals
 - CB lending to government risking adding to inflation

The New Framework



Implications for Central Bank

- Less influence on choice of debt management instrument
- Movement of liquidity away from the banking system as TSA develops
- But as cash management develops:
 - Treasury will reduce cash balances
 - Reduced volatility of cash balances will benefit central bank – the counterpart is reduced volatility in banking sector liquidity
 - Bank may remain as fiscal agent – but clarity important
- Coordination and cooperation
 - Clarity on responsibilities and information flows
 - Operational interactions – eg auction timings
 - Mutual development of money market

Some Policy Challenges - 1

Tbills or CBBills

- Use of CBBills to drain domestic liquidity potentially fragments money market
 - Preferable for the treasury to sell additional TBills at the request of the CB, as an add-on to the normal auction
 - Must sterilize the proceeds by holding them in a separate account at the CB
 - Remunerate at discount rate set in the bill auction

TSA in CB or Commercial Bank

- Intermediate bank may protect CB from cash volatility, but
 - Potentially weakens treasury's policy leverage over management of its cash flows
 - Adds a layer of complexity to coordination; information sharing more cumbersome
 - Exposes the government to moral hazard and credit risk
 - Lack of transparency and cross-subsidy may affect development of banking sector

Some Policy Challenges - 2

Remuneration of Treasury


Deposits at CB

- Good practice to pay interest on treasury deposits at market rate
 - Usually interbank rate or CB's policy rate
 - Improves transparency, avoids cross-subsidy
 - Removes incentive on treasury to take wrong choices on investment of surplus cash
- But treasury should pay transactions-related fees

Other Issues

- Must define any use of overdraft
 - Term, rate, speed of repayment
- Structural surpluses – wealth funds, fiscal reserve funds etc
 - May be managed separately on or off CB's balance sheet
 - In all cases need transparent governance, agreement on objectives, asset allocation, reporting etc
- Who bears monetary policy cost ?
- CB views on debt instruments – eg preference for indexed or FX linked debt?

Coordination Structures: Operations and Services



Coordination Structures

- Must cover both policy and operations
- At different levels
 - Minister/Governor
 - Shadowed by regular meetings between senior ministry and central bank officials
 - Handle high level policy issues, firefighting
 - Identify areas for cooperation
 - Formal committee structures, e.g.
 - Public Debt Committee for high level policy coherence
 - Cash Coordination Committee for daily or weekly cash management operations
 - Technical working groups
 - Day to day operational interaction

Coordination Mechanisms

- Formalize objectives and understandings
 - Legislation, Decrees, Regulations where needed
 - Terms of reference of committees and working groups
 - Memorandums of Understanding or Protocols on operations
 - Service level agreements (SLAs)
- Treasury “ownership” functions logically separate
 - Financial performance of CB, rules applying to dividend, capitalization, etc
 - Best managed separately from operational interactions

Some Issues for the MoU(s)

- The joint program for the development of the money market
 - Including policies and operations for bill issuance and the respective roles of CBbills and Tbills
- How the CB reports its and the market's views about the debt and cash management program and operations (might be covered by the PDC)
- Choice of primary dealers or auction counterparties
 - Shared or independent
- The payment of interest on government balances at the central bank
 - Has be agreed at the policy level, but the basis of interest – maturity, relevant market analogues, etc – should also be identified (or in SLA)
- Information exchanges – respective responsibilities
 - Mechanism of communication and issues covered (e.g. the prospective auction schedule, cash flow forecasts, banking information)
- Determinants of e.g. the timing of respective auctions and the associated market announcements and any prior warning
- [Where the treasury is able to borrow from the CB], understandings of the limits (sums, maturities, ability to roll over etc.) of such borrowing

Service Level Agreements (SLAs)

- Note the range of services supplied is potentially wide
 - Banker, fiscal agent, settlement agent, registrar...
- Some examples of issues covered
 - The notice that both sides would give of any impending change in the auction pattern or timetable
 - The turnaround times by the central bank in handling any relevant transactions, e.g. as fiscal or settlement agent.
 - Details of information flows in either direction, with intended timing, e.g. of cash flow forecasts or transactions across the TSA.
 - The basis of calculation of fees paid for the services (potentially covering compensation for any failure to meet the specified service)
 - Details of the rate of interest to be paid on government accounts
 - Exchange of risk-related information (including audit information)
 - The handling of any business continuity problem
 - The arrangements for handling disputes and for review of the SLA
- SLA normally reviewed regularly , e.g. every year, fees reassessed

Conclusion

- The development of a modern debt and cash management function potentially affects the operations, finances and balance sheets of government and CB (and commercial banks)
 - CB may still control important segment of government balance sheet (FX reserves)
 - Movements of liquidity: but in time reduced fluctuation in cash balances benefits monetary policy
 - Interest payments and transactions fees improve transparency and remove cross subsidy
 - Transitional issues to address
- Importance of structuring at different levels
 - Areas of contention – but scope for cooperation, especially in money market development
 - MoUs and SLAs bring clarity and remove misunderstanding

Thank You!